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ABSTRACT
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Abstract
Representing potential to be a safer, greener and more energy efficient ship, the
development of Maritime autonomous surface ship (MASS) has become the
consensus of the shipping industry. The MASS is expected to come in the near
decades. Although a large quantity of researches have been conducted to verify the
economic, technology and legal feasibility of MASS, the safety management of
MASS has been frequently questioned because of the accompanying uncertain and
risks. This dissertation tries to uncover the potential safety management challenges
and risks of MASS, and puts forward corresponding recommended measures and
strategies for safety management improvement.
In the beginning of this dissertation, the author tries to illustrate a whole picture of
the MASS, including what is a MASS and the how it will significantly revolutionise
the landscape of shipping industry, as well as the various development process of
MASS in China and abroad. MASS is aiming contribute to a more sustainable
maritime transport industry. Through a comprehensive analysis, it can be seen that
the MASS represent an opportunity to reshape the maritime industry bringing
benefits such as increased operational efficiency, human error reduction, emission
reduction, increased safety, and operational cost reduction. However, from the
perspective of safety management, the MASS bring a large number of challenges and
risks on safety regulatory frameworks, maritime legal frameworks, maritime liability
frameworks, reliability of safety critical equipment, cyber security, crew job losses
and skill degradation, etc. Overall, the author concluded that the development of
MASS is feasible, but series of further improvement actions should be taken out.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Shipping is the lifeblood of international trade. It is often the least costly way to
transport large volumes of goods between countries. About 90 percent of world trade,
95 percent of the total crude oil and 99 percent of the total iron ore are transported by
sea (Yan, 2016). With the advantages of large transport capacity and low cost,
shipment plays an irreplaceable role in the transportation, and it may be considered
to be one of the main driving forces of today’s global economy. However, with the
rising fuel costs, crew costs, operation costs, increasing maritime accidents related to
human errors and the more and more rigid environment policies, the green, efficient
and safe ships are urgent needed. Maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS) could
be the answer ( Liu & Zhang, 2016).
MASS is a new concept that will change the conventional methods for ship designing,
testing and approving their systems. In recent years, the development of MASS has
become the consensus of the shipping industry, and Autonomous shipping is the
future of the maritime industry. MASS represent an opportunity to reshape the
maritime industry bringing benefits such as increased operational efficiency, human
error reduction, emission reduction, increased safety, and operational cost reduction.
With the development of science and technology, various levels of autonomy for
transportation industry are really starting to gain ground. For example, on the roads,
autonomous cars have started to operate in recent years. On the railways, unmanned
trains can be monitored and remote controlled from a control centre. The
development of MASS has become technically feasible. However, the existing
regulations, engineering and culture all present challenges as significant as the
development of technology itself.
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1.2 Objective of the study
The objective of this research is to demonstrate the potential of MASS to reshape the
ship design, building and operation with its benefits in economic sustainability,
environmental sustainability and social sustainability. A comprehensive analysis of
MASS is carried out to uncover the potential safety management challenges and risks
in the way towards fully autonomous navigation though MASS is theoretical feasible.
Recognizing those challenges and risks, numbers of safety management
recommendations, including adjustment in regulatory frameworks and legal
framework, basic ship design concepts and critical technologies, are put forward to
make full prepare for the coming maritime revolution. Overall, this research
introduces the about coming autonomous ships era with its potential benefits and
widely public concerns, then puts forward possible preparedness.
1.3 Methodology
The methods applied in this research are mainly literature review, quantitative
analysis, field research, telephone and face to face interviews. Firstly, the relevant
literature was widely reviewed, including appropriate International Maritime
Organization (IMO) documents, international conventions, related program research
achievements, articles from contemporary journals, books and information from
websites. Secondly, a secondary resources and statistical figures were used to carry
out a qualitative analysis on the feasibility of MASS. Furthermore, considering there
is no practical experience available on merchant MASS and their safety in everyday
use, an extensive field research, telephone and face to face interviews was conducted
by visiting various shipping entities to figure out the potential safety management
challenges and risks. Lastly, the possible safety management improvement advice
was presented by shipping experts and senior Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)
officers through opinions exchange.

2

1.4 Structure of dissertation
This dissertation divides into eight chapters. Chapter one gives a brief introduction,
including general background information, objective and methodology of this study.
Chapter two illustrates what is MASS, and gives relevant definitions and
classifications of the MASS. Chapter three demonstrates widely development
progress of the MASS, and a development comparison between home and abroad.
Chapter four comprehensively analyzes the feasibility of MASS, and the
accompanying potential benefits. Chapter five structures a general autonomous ship
system context in terms of technology, manning, operation and navigation. Chapter
six reveals the potential maritime safety management challenges and risks of MASS
which are public concerned. Chapter seven puts forward corresponding
recommended measures and strategies for safety management improvement. Finally,
a last chapter discourses conclusions.
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Chapter 2 What is a maritime autonomous surface ship
2.1 Definitions
In recent years, governments and research institutes have carried out a large number
of researches on MASS and have given many definitions for MASS. However, the
merchant MASS is still in the research and testing phase, and there is no a unified
definition of MASS so far. According to different levels of autonomous, there are
many alternative names for autonomous ships, such as unmanned ships, crewless
ships, smart ships, and Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS) was widely used
as a general term for autonomous ships (Rødseth & Nordahl, 2017). Among the
numerous MASS studies, the European Union (EU), DET NORSKE VERITAS
(DNV), Lloyd's Register (LR), and China Classification Society (CCS) give
representative definition of the MASS.
The DNV defines a MASS as:
A vessel that has some level of automation and self-governance (Rødseth &
Nordahl, 2017).
The EU Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks (MUNIN)
project defines a MASS as:
A vessel with next generation modular control systems and communications
technology that will enable wireless monitoring and control functions both on
and off board. These will include advanced decision support systems to provide
a capability to operate ships remotely under semi or fully autonomous control
(Fraunhofer, 2015).
The CCS defines a MASS as:
A vessel which use of sensors, communications, Internet of things, Internet and
other technical means to automatically perceive and obtain information and
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data of ships themselves, marine environment, logistics, port and other aspects,
and based on computer technology, automatic control technology and large
data processing and analysis technology (CCS, 2015).
Based on the above definitions, A MASS refers to a ship with sensors, automated
navigation, propulsion and auxiliary systems, with the necessary decision logic to
follow mission plans, sense the environment, adjust mission execution according to
the environment, and potentially operate without human intervention.
2.2 Levels of Operational Autonomy
2.2.1 Sheridan Levels of Autonomy for Machine
There are many definitions of autonomy for machine. The level of autonomy (LOA)
is often used to describe the degree to which a machine can act independently, and
the most famous definitions of LOA are developed by Thomas Sheridan. The
Sheridan scale describes a 10-level of autonomy from human control a machine
completely without computer assistance through the machine does everything
autonomously without human interference (RR,2016).
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Table1.Sheridan levels of autonomy

Source: AAWA White Paper
2.2.2 Lloyds Register Levels of Autonomy for MASS
It is expected that the MASS will be operated widely in the near decades. Before
fully autonomous navigation, there will be a picture that different levels of
autonomous ships will navigate with conventional manned ships side by side.
Therefore, the technology transition would be gradually and the operational
autonomy should be “adjustable” or “dynamic”. The Lloyds Register defines an
AL0-AL6 level of autonomy concern navigation-related aspect for MASS, with
detailed autonomy level descriptions and operator roles listed in table 2 (Lloyds
Register, 2016).
Table 2. Lloyds Register Autonomy levels (AL) of MASS
AL
Description
AL 0: Manual steering. Steering controls or set
points for course, etc. are operated
manually.
AL 1: Decision-support on board. Automatic
steering of course and speed in
accordance with the references and route
plan given. The course and speed are
measured by sensors on board.
AL 2: On-board or shore-based decision
support. Steering of route through a
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Operator role
The operator is on board or
performs remote control via
radio link.
The operator inserts the route in
the form of "way points" and the
desired speed. The operator
monitors and changes the course
and speed, if necessary.
Monitoring
operation
and
surroundings. Changing course

AL 3:

AL 4:

AL 5:

AL 6:

sequence of desired positions. The route
is calculated so as to observe a wanted
plan. An external system is capable of
uploading a new route plan.
Execution with human being who
monitors and approves. Navigation
decisions are proposed by the system
based on sensor information from the
vessel and its surroundings.
Execution with human being who
monitors and can intervene. Decisions on
navigation and operational actions are
calculated by the system which executes
what has been calculated according to
the operator's approval.
Monitored autonomy. Overall decisions
on navigation and operation are
calculated by the system. The
consequences and risks are countered
insofar as possible. Sensors detect
relevant elements in the surroundings
and the system interprets the situation.
The system calculates its own actions
and performs these. The operator is
contacted in case of uncertainty about
the interpretation of the situation.
Full autonomy. Overall decisions on
navigation and operation are calculated
by the system. Consequences and risks
are calculated. The system acts based on
its analyses and calculations of its own
capability and the surroundings' reaction.
Knowledge about the surroundings and
previous and typical events are included
at a "machine intelligent" level.

Source: (Lloyds Register, 2016)

and speed if a situation
necessitates this. Proposals for
interventions can be given by
algorithms.
Monitoring the system's function
and approving actions before
they are executed.
An operator monitors the
system's
functioning
and
intervenes
if
considered
necessary. Monitoring can be
shore-based.
The system executes the actions
calculated by itself. The operator
is contacted unless the system is
very certain of its interpretation
of the surroundings and of its
own condition and of the thus
calculated actions. Overall goals
have been determined by an
operator. Monitoring may be
shore-based.
The system makes its own
decisions and decides on its own
actions. Calculations of own
capability and prediction of
surrounding traffic's expected
reaction. The operator is
involved in decisions if the
system is uncertain. Overall
goals may have been established
by the system. Shore-based
monitoring.

2.2.3 Operational Levels of Autonomy for MASS
The autonomy levels of Thomas Sheridan and Lloyds Register have widely covered
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a range of operational condition and roles. However, before fully autonomy, we have
to considerate an important factor-the manning levels. Therefore, based on the
autonomy levels proposed in the other texts referenced above, the author proposes
the operational levels (OL) of autonomy concerning manning levels.
Table 3. Operational Levels of MASS

Source: Complied by the author
2.3 Manning Levels of MASS
With the development of autonomous technologies, more and more human labor will
be replaced by machines. Over past decades, we have achieved periodically
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unmanned engine room, and it is only a matter of time to achieve unmanned bridge.
According to different levels of autonomy, the manning levels of MASS can be
classified into four levels.
Table 4.Manning Levels of MASS

Source: Complied by the author
2.4 Classification of Autonomous Ship
A classification of different autonomous maritime vehicles is shown in Figure 1.
Autonomous maritime vehicles can be divides into Unmanned Underwater Vehicles
(UUV) and Autonomous Surface Vehicles (ASV). The UUV which is operated
remotely or autonomous have been widely used for purposes of underwater scientific
research or military use, while the ASV is in concept and research stage. Some of the
small Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) has been developed and put in service
(Campbell & Naeem, 2012).
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Figure 1. Classification of autonomous maritime vehicles
Source: Complied by the author

Remotely Operate Vehicle

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

Unmanned Surface Vehicles

Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship

Figure 2. Images of Autonomous ships
Source: Goolge pictures
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Chapter 3 MASS is all about to happen in the near future

3.1 The Initial Concept of MASS: e-Navigation

Advanced modern technologies have promoted navigation safety effectively. With
the applications of radar, Automatic Identification System (AIS), Global Positioning
System (GPS), and Electronic Chart Display and Information System (EDICS), the
navigation operations have undergone tremendous changes. These advanced
navigational equipment can help the sailor to better understand the surrounding and
the ship’s condition. Furthermore, the new generation of shore-based navigation aid
facilities, such as Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), have facilitated the navigation
greatly.
However, we cannot ignore the negative impacts of modern navigational
technologies. The independence of existing navigation equipment has increased
workload for duty crews. In addition, the increasing complexity and inconsistency of
equipment have affected user efficiency, such as increasing the information change
workload between ships, companies and maritime authorities (Burmeister & Bruhn,
2014). Furthermore, the increasing complexity of ships will require more diversified
capabilities for crew, and degrade seldom used navigation skills.
Therefore, in 2005, the IMO proposed the e-Navigation concept and aims to improve
the safety of navigation through modern technologies. In 2008, the IMO
Sub-committee on Navigation Safety adopted a strategy proposal and proposed an
execution plan that includes concepts such as user needs, system structure, gap
analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and risk analysis. In 2012, this plan had been
implemented.
E-navigation is the initial concept of MASS. The scope of the e-Navigation project is
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defined as:
"the harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of
marine information on board and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth to
berth navigation and related services for safety and security at sea and protection
of the marine environment" (IMO MSC, 2009).

3.2 IMO Process of MASS

Recognizing MASS represents the potential to reshape ship’s design, building and
operation, the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) had started considering
regulatory scoping exercise for the use of MASS. In 2017, the MSC considered a
proposal on how IMO instruments might be revised to address the complex issue to
ensure safe, secure and environmentally sound operation of MASS, including
interactions with ports, pilotage, responses to incidents and marine pollution. It was
considered essential to maintain the reliability, robustness, resiliency and redundancy
of underlying communications, software and engineering systems. As a starting point,
the Committee agreed to start a regulatory scoping exercise over the four sessions of
the Committee, until 2020, which would take into account the different levels of
automation, including semi-autonomous and unmanned ships (ABS, 2017).

3.3 Great Market Potential and Widely Researches on MASS

3.3.1 Japan MASS Research and Development

In Japan, MASS research and development become the focus of attention for the
shipping industry in the next five years. In 2012, 29 companies including the Japan
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Shipbuilding Association and the NIPPON KAIJI KYOKAI (NK) jointly launched
the Smart Ship Application Platform Development Project (SSAP), which is mainly
to solve the problem of smart navigation. So far, the SSAP has developed a variety of
smart ship systems, through which the most suitable route and speed can be selected
to achieve collision avoidance and navigation efficiency (Fan & Xu, 2015). What is
more, these systems have completed real ship testing on two ships.
In 2015, DNV and Nippon Yusen jointly created the “Digital Twins” project which
is maritime smart data center. In the same year, two international standards for
"Shipborne Sea Condition Data Server" and "Standard Data for Shipborne
Machinery and Equipment" initiated by Japan were approved by the International
Organization for Standardization’s Technical Committees (ISO/TC).
In 2017, a technology concept of ocean-going autonomous system jointly developed
by the Mitsui River, Port and Aerospace Technology Association of Japan, etc. had
been promoted in Japan. In addition, Japan’s shipyards and shipping companies are
planning to jointly develop a large unmanned fleet in 2025 (Wu, 2017).
According to the statistics of the China Ship Information Center, from 2013 to 2015,
Japan has led and published about 15 international standards in ISO/TC, of which 9
standards relate to ship navigation and letter transmission. There are a total of 10
standards under research that are led by Japan, among which five standards involving
ship navigation, heading control, and navigation recorders. It can be clearly seen that
the development focus of the international standardization strategy in Japan over the
past two years and the next five years has been centered on the field of "smart ships."
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3.3.2 Korea MASS Research and Development

MASS is an important strategy of Korea maritime industry. In Korea, the research of
MASS is mainly implemented by the Hyundai Heavy Industries, the Daewoo
Shipbuilding Marine, and the Samsung Heavy Industries. Among them, the Hyundai
Heavy Industries has made great progress in the area of smart ship research and
development. The Hyundai Heavy Industries focus on practical applications of
MASS and have made substantial headway. In 2009, the Hyundai Heavy Industries
began working with the Korea Electronic Testing & Research Institute (ETRI) to
apply information technology to ships to jointly develop “Smart Ships 1.0”. In 2011,
Korea had built the world's first "smart ship". Since then, the Hyundai Heavy
Industries has received a large number of building orders for smart ships. Hyundai
Heavy Industries had received more than 70 orders for smart vessels in 2011, of
which more than 40 orders for smart boats came from the Danish Muller-Maersk
Group. Then, the Hyundai Heavy Industries cooperated with the Korea's Ministry of
Energy, and many IT technology companies to establish an IT innovation center for
the shipbuilding industry and jointly developed an upgraded version of “Smart Ship
2.0”. In 2013, the Hyundai Heavy Industries released the research results and
promoted the plan of “Smart Ship 2.0”.
In 2015, the Hyundai Heavy Industries collaborated with the Accenture to develop
smart ships and launched the Ocean Link smart ship systems. In 2016, the Korean
government released the "Strengthening Scheme for Shipbuilding Industry
Competitiveness", which proposed to invest 35 billion won to support the
development of core technologies related to smart ships, and subsequently
announced to invest other 7 trillion won to support new industries such as smart
ships. In the same year, Korea’s Marine Fisheries Department launched the “Smart
Navigation” project with a total investment of US$114 million.
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3.3.3 European Union MASS Research and Development

European Union is the leader of MASS research and development. So far, the
European Union has carried out a large number of forward-looking MASS studies
with a high level of research and development. The development of MASS in Europe
was first begun in 2006 with the development of the Inland River Navigation
Integrated Information System. This system was the first to integrate information
technology, communications technology, electronic control technology, and computer
processing technologies into the traditional inland river system. It provides eight
major information service functions such as traffic management, logistics
information and emergency rescue for inland shipping, achieving efficient, safe, and
environmentally friendly inland shipping, and has aroused the attention of shipping
industry to smart ships(Liu & Shan, 2017). Since then, Finland and the European
Union have successively launched the COAST WATCH national water traffic
management platform and the MONALISA project to explore the development of
smart ships.
In 2012, the EU launched the MUNIN project. The MUNIN program verifies the
feasibility of merchant MASS, and demonstrates the relevant frontier technologies
and standards (Fraunhofer, 2015). In addition, a further analysis on laws and
regulations revision is carried out in the MUNIN. The EU plans to complete research
on the development of unmanned ships and the possibility of autonomous navigation
by 2034.
In 2014, the Rolls-Royce launched a Smart Ship Application Project (AAWA). This
project aims to realize autonomous navigation in the coming decades. It is expected
to achieve remote support and operation of ships by 2020, then realize remote control
of ships in the near sea area by 2025. By 2030, remote control of ships in the far sea
area will be realized, and fully autonomous navigation will be realized by 2035. In

15

addition, Finland is also launching a smart ship program that aims to create a “smart
ship transportation eco-environment”, then create a completely intelligent shipping
system in the Baltic Sea by 2025.
The Danish Maritime Bureau is also preparing for the about building of MASS. The
Danish Maritime Bureau has cooperated with the Technical University of Denmark
to launch an unmanned ship research, aiming to increase the knowledge base of the
technology and establish a preliminary framework for the plan, thus ensuring the
successful construction of unmanned ships.

3.3.4 China MASS Research and Development

In recent years, China regards MASS as a national manufacturing strategy. China
tries to draft and amend relevant regulations related to MASS with fully
consideration of China's shipping industry development level, and promote the
orderly and healthy development of MASS. In 2013, China Ship Systems Research
Institute and America National Science Foundation Center jointly established the
"Smart Marine Equipment Information Intelligent Management and Application
Technology Innovation Center" to promote the development of related core
technologies and products. In 2015 and 2016, the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology of China organized the “Intelligent Ship Top Planning” and
“Smart Ship 1.0” scientific research projects respectively.
In 2015, China issued the “Made in China 2025” and made key explanations for
smart ship. In the same year, China Classification Society (CCS) released the “Smart
Ship Code”. This code is the world's first smart ship code and sets specific
requirements for functions that smart ships should possess. In 2017, the Joint Key
Laboratory of Unmanned Ship Technologies and Systems was established in China
to study not only the design and construction technologies of unmanned ships, but
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also the study of relevant regulations and standards.

3.4 Levels of Development Comparison between Home and Abroad

The levels of development vary from country to country. The technological levels of
MASS development can be measured by many comparing factors, such as levels of
autonomy, autonomous navigation systems, critical equipment, and remote control.
The earliest research on MASS was conducted by Europe, and Europe is a leader in
the development of smart ship safety, feasibility and related regulations. Japan is a
pioneer who has developed series of technical standards for MASS. With abundant
shipbuilding experience, Korea's MASS are being industrialized, and the main
application is the development of a large number of autonomous systems and
communications networks. In contrast, China's development level of MASS is at an
early stage in terms of technology research (Bo & Zhang, 2017). However, at present,
domestic research and exploration in the field of MASS are actively being carried
out.
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Chapter 4 Comprehensive analysis of MASS

MASS has the potential to contribute to a sustainable maritime industry. Although it
seems hard to realize fully autonomous operation in the short term, MASS is feasible
in terms of economic, safety, security, legal and technology. MASS has the potential
to reshape the maritime industry by bringing benefits such as human error reduction,
increased operational efficiency, fuel reduction, emission reduction, and operational
costs reduction (Rødseth & Burmeister, 2015). In addition, The MASS can also
mitigate the crisis of shortage in the supply of seafarer.

4.1Feasibility Study of the MASS

4.1.1Cost-benefit Analysis

Ship-owners always give priority to profit. A cost-benefit analysis which was carried
out by the MUNIN project showed that autonomous bulk carrier is profitable for the
shipping companies. While comparing with a reference conventional bulker, the
autonomous bulk carrier is commercially feasible under certain circumstances.
According to the MUNIN project, the autonomous bulker can improve more seven
Million US Dollar (mUSD) expected present value than a conventional bulker over a
25-year lifetime (RR, 2016). Firstly, crewless MASS can save a lot of crew costs,
which represent about half of the operation costs. Secondly, there will be a higher
efficiency of land-based services in port and the Shore Control Centre (SCC). Lastly,
perfect autonomous ship design ensures better fuel efficiency, larger cargo carrying
capacity and lighter ship weight (Wróbel & Montewka, 2017). Although MASS will
cost higher building costs, overall, MASS represent an opportunity to make more
profit than conventional ships.
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Figure 3.the MUNIN financial analysis of an autonomous bulker
Source: (RR, 2016)

4.1.2 Safety and Security Analysis

In addition to profitability, safety and security are also important factors affecting the
implementation of MASS. Between 2005 and 2014, collision and foundering are the
two highest probability incident categories, and they represented almost half of total
loss accidents. Furthermore, most maritime accident root causes are human errors.
Based on an analysis of collision and foundering accident models, after a proper
operational and robustness testing, the accident rates of collision and foundering of a
MUNIN concept MASS are ten times less than conventional manned shipping.
Further analysis showed that the reduction of accident rate is mainly due to the
elimination of fatigue issues. In addition, risks of engine and other system failures for
MASS are expected to be lower because of redundancy ship design. In terms of fire
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and explosion accidents, MASS are likely to be much less risky than manned ships
due to more efficient extinguishing systems in fully enclosed spaces. Finally, cyber
security and piracy are widespread concern issues. However, the MASS can be
designed and built to provide very high resilience against digital and physical attacks.

4.1.3 Legal and Liability Analysis

The design, building, and operation of MASS would present significant challenges to
the entire international maritime legal framework and liability framework. However,
generally speaking, the MASS does not seem to present any unsurmountable obstacle
in terms of laws and liability. Many shipping experts have reservations about MASS,
and they think MASS is incompatible with the existing international regulations. For
example, Peter Hinchcliffe, secretary-general of the International Chamber of
Shipping, publicly stated that he was not optimistic about MASS. However, we
should bear in mind that maritime revolutions are never easy. When the
containerization was introduced in the shipping industry, it needed a change in
thinking and the industry became more capital intensive which provoked social
resistance and more contractual negotiations (Tom, 2015). Any novel innovation
process in an industry such as shipping may follow a similar trend.
Rules and standards reflect the social opinion. Judging from the historical trajectory,
laws follow the development of science and technology, instead of constraining the
development of society. If the MASS can operate at least as safe as conventional
manned ships, and they can offer benefits as well, the rules shall change gradually.
The legal framework and liability framework should not impede the development of
MASS in maritime transport, but a number of aspects related to the legal
responsibility of using autonomous vessels need to be clarified.
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4.1.4 Technical Analysis

Today, technically speaking, full vehicular autonomy is indeed feasible. Driven by
the global need for increased traffic safety, emission reduction, and the large
mass-market potential, the development of autonomous vehicles, including
autonomous land vehicles, aviation and also marine vessels, have been through great
progress over the past decade. The general technologies needed to make MASS a
reality laying in them. The most convincing progress has been demonstrated by the
autonomous

land

vehicles.

Thanks

to

continuous

advancing

autonomous

technologies, vehicles can perceive the surrounding environment then plan the path
independently, or be remotely controlled by operators. In fact, many autonomous
land vehicles, aviation and also marine vessels have put into military applications,
such as small patrol and attack boats. The Rolls-Royce recently successfully
demonstrated their achievement of MASS- a small Shore Control Center: operators
monitor and control a global fleet in real time through interactive smart screens,
voice recognition systems, holograms and drone monitoring.

Figure 4.The Rolls-Royce remote control autonomous innovation
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Source:Rolls-Royce touts remote-controlled cargo ship as "future of the maritime
industry"

4.2 Benefits of MASS

4.2.1More safer and less life losses

MASS has the potential to reduce the occurrence of erroneous operations, avoid
casualties and reduce ship risks. Today, the vast majority of marine deaths and
injuries occur on board the sailors’ own ships (Ai & Zhang, 2015). MASS use a large
amount of advanced equipment instead of human labor, and the operators normally
plays an auxiliary role in monitoring or remotely control under emergency. As a
result of crewless, most on-board crew members’ deaths and injuries can be avoided.
In addition, human error is a dominant cause of many casualties at sea. According to
the Allianz insurance report of Munich, Germany, 75% to 96% of marine accidents
are caused by human errors, e.g. personnel decision-making and operating errors,
improper emergency response, or fatigue. MASS could be the answer. Autonomous
look-out, navigation and collision avoidance will provide significant safety benefits
with regard to that. It is estimated that the probability of accidents of MASS will be
reduced by more than half compared with traditional ships.

4.2.2 Economic sustainability

The biggest driven factors of MASS will be economic sustainable. While adding a
higher building cost which is acceptable, the MASS represents an opportunity to save
a large amount of operational costs. Crew costs on-board are one of the main
operational costs. With the development of society, the labor costs are expected to
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increase year by year. In 2011, the Drewry Report on Ship Operating Costs showed
that an average between 31 and 36% of the total ship operation costs are the labor
costs on-board (see table 5). When considering the additional crew necessities,
purchase, installation and maintenance of service facilities, the costs related to crew
may up to 44% of the total cost (Ødseth & Burmeister, 2014). Furthermore, because
there is no need for crews and their facilities such as deck houses, dormitories,
life-savings, fire-fighting and ventilation, heating, and sewerage systems, this will
make the vessels lighter and smoother for the purpose of full loading, thereby
reducing fuel consumption and carbon emissions (Qin & Di, 2017). According to
calculations, an unmanned ship can save at least 12% to 15% of fuel cost
(Kretschmann & Burmeister, 2017).
Table 5.Costs for dry bulker

Source: Secondary data based on “Ship Operating Costs 2011-2012: Annual Review
and Forecast” and “Dry Bulk Forecaster 3Q11: Quarterly Forecasts of Dry Bulk
Market”
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4.2.3 Ecologic sustainability

Through energy saving and emission reduction, the MASS will contribute to the
green shipping greatly. The shipping industry represents about 3% of global
greenhouse gas emissions, and the industry has acknowledged that it also needs to
contribute to future reductions so as to synchronize with land based greenhouse gas
emissions (Veronika & Ivar, 2009). Today, slow steaming is a decent choice to
realize energy saving and emission reduction. Looking at an exemplary route from
Porto de Tubarao to Hamburg, a transit speed reduction from 16 to 11 knots should
reduce fuel consumption by about 54% and thus avoid about 1.000 tons of carbon
dioxide emissions (see table 6). However, while slow steaming will reduce fuel costs
and greenhouse gas emissions, it will entail higher costs due to longer sailing times
which in turn have an impact on crew cost, ship hire and the probability of technical
faults and related off-hire penalties (Ødseth & Burmeister, 2014). Slow steaming also
increases the societal challenge of providing attractive working conditions on long
and slow intercontinental voyage. If the MASS is widely used, these problems will
be solved. Furthermore, it was also stipulated that an unmanned ship can be operated
more efficiently with more advanced automatic energy management systems and
improved routing and navigation. Thereby, MASS would provide a possibility to
foster ecological sustainability.
Table 6.Exemplary costs calculation to show slow steaming benefits
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Source: Secondary data based on “Maritime economics, 3rd ed., Routledge, London,
New York”.

4.2.4 Social sustainability

The MASS represents a way out of the impasse of a shortage in the supply of
seafarer due to the job’s perceived unattractiveness and a growing demand for
seafarer caused by slow steaming and increasing transport volumes. In recent years,
as ships have become more complex, the quality of crew members has become
increasingly demanding. However, due to the boring life at sea, which is far away
from family and land, and full of hidden dangers, the seafarer career gradually
becomes unattractive. Many seafarers choose to quit this profession, and many
international shipping companies face the dilemma of difficult recruitment of
seafarers (Qin & Di, 2017). Although the supply and demand of the crew market is
affected by the market price, in the long run, especially in Europe, most parties agree
that there will be a factual shortage. A current market pool in Germany shows that
80% of the maritime stakeholders already claim a lack of nautical and technical
officers (Jahn&Bosse, 2011). If MASS are widely used, it could reduce the
expected pressure on the labor market for seafarer as it would enable, at least partly,
to reduce the labor intensity of ship operation. MASS can reduce labor intensity of
ship operation and release crew for more demanding and interesting work, to attract
and retain seagoing professionals.
MASS will also open new professional perspectives for seafarers. The boring
on-board routine tasks would be automated, and the demanding but interesting
navigational and technical jobs will transfer from ship to Shore Control Center,
which will make seafarer career more attractive and family friendly than today.
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4.2.5 Mitigate the Pirate crisis

The piracy problem has plagued governments and the entire shipping industry for
long time, MASS might be a solution. Today, Pirates are getting more and more
rampant in places like Somalia. So far, Somali pirates have still hijacked nearly 50
hostages. The design of MASS will make it very difficult for pirates to get on board
the ship. Even if the pirates get on board, it is difficult to for them to control the
MASS. The SCC can stop or slow down the MASS, so that the navy and the policy
can take back the ship. Moreover, it is easier to recapture the ship. Because without
the crew being held hostage, pirates do not have any high-priced chips. Therefore,
for the pirates, there is no way to obtain a high ransom and there is a huge risk of
robbery.
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Chapter 5 the Autonomous Ship System Context

There will be a new maritime ecological chain in the autonomous era. As a new
player of the shipping sector, the MASS needs to be supported by advanced
technologies, new operator teams and new maritime entities.

5.1 Technologies for MASS

5.1.1 Shore Control Centre

The Shore Control Centre (SCC) would will a necessary part of MASS. On the one
hand, the SCC is a backup in case the MASS encounters unexpected events. On the
other hand, it needs the SCC to build substantial connection between the owners and
MASS so as to satisfy legal requirements that someone is in control of the ship. The
SCC will provide continuous monitoring on the MASS operation. Firstly, the SCC
can offer additional safety supportive information. For example, the on-board sensor
systems can only perceive the navigation environment within a small area, so it
needs further information, such as tropical cyclone paths, severe sea conditions and
tides of berths in the destination, to ensure safety navigation. Secondly, in case of any
unexpected events which cannot be handled by the autonomous program, the
operators of SCC will take control the ships until problems solved. Finally, when the
SCC is in charge of the MASS, in terms of liability, the responsibility of the ship’s
crew members will transfer to the SCC.
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Figure 5. the Shore Control Center
Source: Research in maritime autonomous systems project Results and technology
potentials

5.1.2 On-board Sensor Systems

The on-board sensor systems can replace the lookout crew members by constantly
collecting and processing data. The sensor information can be divided into internal
environmental information and surrounding environment information. On the one
hand, the on-board sensor systems can collect information from existing sensors of
pressure, temperature, rotational speed and cargo hold, etc., so as to monitor and
process internal environmental information, such as the working status of navigation
equipment, engine and cargo information. On the other hand, the on-board sensor
systems can use radar, AIS, ECDIS, infrared and visible light cameras to detect
external objects and then analyze whether they pose a danger to ships. The collected
sensor information is not only used for the autonomous navigation system, but also
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can also be displayed in the SCC for operators to learn the real situation.
Another key technology is sensor fusion. The collected sensor information could be
overload, even contradict each other. Therefore, sensor fusion can be used to further
analyze the real situation then to take corresponding actions.

Figure 6. The on-board sensor system
Source: Research in maritime autonomous systems project Results and technology
potentials

5.1.3 Autonomous Navigation System

Through utilizing the sensor information and shore-based information, the
Autonomous Navigation System is a smart system which is programmed to operate
fully autonomously or be controlled by the SCC according to relevant regulations,
such as IMO regulations and regional laws. This system can ensure MASS to follow
its planned route within certain deviations to adjust the planned voyage. Deviations
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can be caused by unexpected encounter situations, such as heavy sea, severe weather
conditions and complex ship traffic. On the one hand, this system can operate the
MASS safely in both normal and emergency conditions. On the other hand, basing
on loading condition, ship draft, wing speed and wave angle, etc., it can also
optimize the voyage plans by adjusting its speeds and courses to achieve energy
efficiency and emission reduction. A general context of autonomous navigation
system is shown in figure 7.

Figure 7. the context of autonomous navigation system
Source: Complied by the author
5.1.4 Smart Engine Monitoring and Control System

The Smart Engine Monitoring and Control System can be regard as an enhancement
to conventional ship engine systems. With the development of MASS, the periodical
unmanned engine room will evolve into a continuous unmanned. Therefore, it needs
to increase additional advanced condition monitoring functionalities to make up
human absent. In order to operate the engine systems autonomously or tele-control, it
needs to add increased digital interfaces to the autonomous navigation systems and
the SCC. Careful diagnostics are critical to ship’s normal function and better
maintenance planning, and the continuous monitoring contributes to the prevention
of malfunctions and breakdowns of ship’s systems. Such a monitoring and control
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diagnostic system for MASS has been developed with robust detection abilities for
e.g. broken, burned-on or missing piston rings or for radial wear (RR, 2016). This
system also detects thermal overloads of the cylinder liner. Technical condition
indicator is an important developed concept for MASS.

5.1.5 Maritime Communication Systems

The maritime communication systems are bridges connecting the autonomous
navigation system and the shore-based support system. Because it needs to timely
send the on-board collected sensor information to SCC, and receive remote control
directions from the SCC, there should be a high-bandwidth, low-latency and low-cost
maritime communication system. Since it needs to transmit a large amount of sensor
information, equipment status information, radar images, sensor video, etc., the
transition volume is very large. Therefore, the data needs to be compressed before
transmission, so as to achieve the purpose of cost savings. In order to ensure smooth
communications in different weather and sea conditions, it is necessary to equip
multiple communication systems, such as Maritime Satellite Systems, Very Small
Aperture Terminal (VSAT), Comet, Public mobile communications, etc. In different
situations, the communication system should be able to automatically select the
appropriate data transmission route to improve the overall performance of the
maritime communication system and reduce delay and cost. When only one
communication path is available, the systems should ensure that high-priority data is
sent first. For example, in the case of a collision emergency, priority should be given
to sending the collision avoidance remote control commands, and then secondary
information such as weather information should be sent (Gao, 2017).

5.1.6 Smart Maintenance System
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Today, most shipboard systems are designed in consideration of the crew's
availability. Without crew members on board, any significant technical failure could
breakdown the MASS while sailing at sea. To ensure the ship will not run into
problems when operating at sea, the crewless MASS must be designed with high
redundancy and easy maintenance. Thus, a smart maintenance system needs to be
developed to fill the gap. The user interface of the system will be integrated in the
SCC to gain sufficient monitoring and support so as to diagnosis the abnormal, then
to take further corrective actions. In addition, artificial intelligence is a crucial part of
this system. It needs on-board robots to replace crews to conduct tasks automatically
(RL, 2015). Robots can be programmed to assemble, inspect, manipulate and explore,
or remote controlled by the SCC to perform their duty.

5.1.7 Smart Cargo Management System

The Smart Cargo Management System refers to autonomous monitoring and control
of cargoes and cargo holds through the use of sensors and control systems (Gong &
Ji, 2016). Based on the monitored data, during ships’ loading / unloading, this system
can optimize the loading / unloading plan, thus realizing the intelligent management
of ship cargo. During the voyage, the system can continue to observe the status of the
goods, such as possible movement of goods, flooding, Self-heating or fire, then take
further emergency measures.

5.2 Operators of MASS

5.2.1 Operate team of SCC

The operate team of Shore Control Centre provides sufficient safety supportive
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information, as well as continuous monitoring and remote control of the MASS. The
operational team of control center consists of experienced officers, engineers and the
company managers, who conduct on-line monitoring of the navigational status,
equipment working status and cargo status. Most of the time, the ships are under the
control of Autonomous Navigation System without any human intervention. In case
of any complicated problems which cannot be safely handled by the computer, the
operators will assist to take control the ships until problems solved.

5.2.2 On-board Control Team

The On-board Control Team is a mobile team that may enter the MASS. On one hand,
considering the complicated traffic condition in port, and the key operations of
berthing or leaving berthing, most MASS will be designed for pilot station to pilot
station. Thus, it needs an On-board Control team who will take over the MASS when
entering the port or leaving the port. On the other hand, if there is any emergency or
accident, such as a critical breakdown of some ship systems or collision accident, the
On-board Control team will direct control the MASS until the problem solves. The
On-board Control team consists of experienced officers, engineers, maintenance
personnel and electronic personnel, etc.

5.3 General maritime entities
The common maritime entities that any MASS may relate to are shown in table 7
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Table 7. the general maritime entities

Source: Complied by the author

34

Chapter 6 Potential Challenges and Risks on Safety of MASS

Safety of MASS is the most widely public concern which has been questioned
frequently. Safety imposes essential constraining requirements for the MASS’s
design and implementation. In principle, the operation of MASS shall be at least as
safe as the conventional ships with fully consideration of uncertainties and potential
risks. When the levels of autonomy move higher, the target level of safety should be
higher than the existing ships.
Compared with the manned conventional ships, the MASS has been questioned due
to challenges and risks on safety regulatory frameworks, maritime legal frameworks,
maritime liability frameworks, reliability of safety critical equipment, cyber security,
crew job losses and skill degradation, etc.

6.1 Maritime Safety Regulatory Frameworks

MASS is a new player in the shipping industry. Over past centuries, the maritime
regulatory framework has not anticipated MASS, and many features of MASS are
incompatible with the existing international regulations. From a regulatory
perspective, the shipping industry is not designed for the digital revolution. From a
historical point of view, the formation of a maritime regulatory framework takes a
long time and follows the development of science and technology rather than driving
the development of science and technology. Therefore, the maritime regulatory
framework should not be an obstacle to MASS. However, we should clearly
recognize that the maritime regulatory framework needs to be adjusted accordingly
to accommodate the operations of the MASS. For example, we need to change the
concept of supervision from seafarers to autonomous systems. In addition, expert
committees/panels will be created, and international bodies will need to provide
legislative support for the technical developments.
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6.2 Maritime Legal Frameworks

Maritime law is a functional term used for describing a whole range of laws and
other legal sources that govern the legal framework related to ships and their
operation. It includes a variety of different legal systems, ranging from international
law to regional and national rules and down to local rules. It covers issues of public
concerns, such as safety, security and environmental protection as well as civil law
matters, such as contracts of carriage, liability and compensation for damage, salvage
and rules related to marine risks and insurance, to name but a few.
One of the main obstacles to the MASS is the revision of conflict maritime legal
frameworks. In general, there is no insurmountable obstacle in the application of
MASS. However, of course, there is still a long way to go before the legal
amendments on the use of MASS. First of all, the conventions and domestic laws
governing the supervision of MASS are not yet sound. Due to the lagging nature of
international conventions and domestic legislation, all aspects related to MASS are
not comprehensive yet, and some characteristics of MASS are even deviating from
the conventions (Xu & Zhang, 2017). For example, the terms of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) stipulate that “each flag state must
provide qualified crew for the ship according to its own minimum manning
regulations”. Obviously, an unmanned ship does not meet this clause. In order to
adapt to the development trend of MASS, it is extremely necessary to strengthen the
revision and improvement of maritime conventions and laws.

36

Table 8. Summary of different maritime laws.

Source: Complied by the author
At present, the IMO has established more than 50 effective conventions and rules for
the world's contracting parties (Cai & Ma, 2017). These conventions and rules are
mandatory for the States parties to adhere to. At the same time, these conventions
and rules will also be converted into the regulations of the shipping industry of each
State Party. The development of MASS must be supported by conventions and rules.
The revision of conventions and rules of MASS will be a complex and large and
even subversive work.

6.3 Maritime Liability Frameworks

The existing maritime liability rules may need to be interpreted, amended, and
possibly supplemented by dedicated rules to supplement the traditional maritime
liability framework. Even if it is not necessary to immediately change the basis of
MASS's liability, we should clearly recognize that technological development of
high level of autonomy may pose challenges to the current liability framework.
While errors committed by SCC operators controlling remotely-operated ships are
probably to be treated in the same way as errors committed by on-board crew
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members, autonomous technology may generate new types of errors and causal
relationships. For example, damages cause by equipment or software failure of the
autonomous system. In this case, the operator would probably be liable, at least in
part, if he fail to override the autonomous system.
However, the inclusion of human intervention is even more complicated. If the
connection between the MASS and the controller is cut off, the MASS will have to
rely entirely on its autonomous system. For example, if damages caused by failures
in the autonomous system, such as wrongful programming etc., it is controversial
that the operators carry the liability under a strictly fault-based liability scheme. With
the development of highly automated systems, such a fault-based liability scheme
may be out of season. Therefore, the liability framework should take manufacturer's
responsibilities into consideration.

6.4 Human Factors Issues in Remote Operation and Monitoring

While MASS represents an opportunity to reduce human based errors, there are a
number of potential human factors issues related to operation and monitoring of
MASS with safety implications. Firstly, there would not be bodily feeling of the ship
rocking or ship sense when the SCC operators remote control the MASS. The sensor
systems may not help the SCC operators to fully understand all the real situations. In
practice, steering of small-size ships can be adjusted in accordance with the wave
formation through bodily sense of the ship. Secondly, due to the complicated sensor
systems, the SCC operators could be exposed to information overload and therefore
no longer able to make sense of the situation. The problem would be even graver if
one person would monitor several vessels as steering the overview from one vessel to
another could be a potential point for mishaps (Osga & Williams, 2015).
Additionally, boredom and vigilance maintenance have to be considered. The SCC
operators work in a safe and comfortable environment, as a nature they may reduce
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safety alertness (Wahlström & Hakulinen, 2015). For example, in a previous study,
92% of unmanned aircraft system operators have reported “moderate” to “total”
boredom. Boredom could results as a loss of vigilance and is therefore a risk factor.

6.5 Cyber Security

With further development of autonomy level, cyber security has been questioned
frequently. In 2015, the remote hijacking of the Jeep car led to the recall of millions
of Cherokee events for the first time to make everyone realize that autonomous
technologies will also be a threat to hackers. Researchers at the University of
Washington and the University of California, San Diego, conducted an intrusion test
and declared that it is possible that millions of cars and trucks using their computer
systems could not be braked. The exposing loopholes and flaws of autonomous
systems may become a hard-hit area for cyber attacks. It can be foreseen that hacking
attacks against driverless cars will increase, and large-scale car attacks will Bring
cities and even threaten the lives of drivers and pedestrians. Likewise, remotely
transmitting of ship operation and management also introduces cyber security risks.
Generally, anyone skilful and capable to attain access into the autonomous system
could take control of the ship and change its operation according to hackers’
objectives. Compared with driverless cars, the consequences of cyber attacks aiming
at MASS will be much more disastrous. If an unmanned full load oil tanker is
hijacked by the terrorists, they may use it to attack a city.

6.6 Cargo Management

In existing ships, the chief mate and captain are in charge of cargo management.
When in loading/unloading operation, the chief mate should be on site to ensure the
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operations are in accordance with relevant work procedures and the ship specific
cargo manual. However, lacking well cargo management by the permanent crew
on-board the MASS, the shipper and consigner may be unwilling to entrust such high
value cargo to a crewless ship. The responsibility for cargo management may transit
from the crew members to port operators. On-board cargo management is systematic
professional job which needs well training and strong sense of responsibility, the
existing dockers may be not capable for such work. Compared with the
longshoremen, on-board crew members have a much deeper personal interest to
ensure that cargo loading condition and ship equipments are on position. This may
increase cargo related incidents.
Furthermore, when sailing at deep sea, crewless MASS only can take limit actions to
take any cargo related measures. The sensor systems can help to monitor cargo
condition, but there is no extra equipment facilitating additional measures so far. It
needs further research to identify useful actions to cure cargo related problems ,such
as cargo shift, leaks, problems with moisture, fire and flooding.

6.7 Managing Emergencies

With decreased crew size or even crewless on-board, the MASS may fail to manage
emergencies which need specific prompt response actions. While dealing with never
met emergencies, it will beyond the MASS limit which is programmed in advance.
Flexibility, self-learning and innovation thinking are critical human nature to manage
emergencies, it is doubtful that MASS can be designed with such characteristics.
Due to the limitations of currently available technologies, another problem is that
how a MASS can assist in emergency situations related to other ships. Helping each
other is an excellent maritime tradition, and helping the distress vessels and persons
at sea is an obligation under international law. While facing emergency situations
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that need immediately hands-on help, the MASS can offer few help but only
emergencies report.

For example, though the MASS can transmit video and sensor

data to search and rescue entities, it is impossible for a merchant crewless MASS
which is designed without life saving appliances to get the help-seeker out of water.

6.8 Integration with Existing Transport System

Another challenge is the difficulty in communicating and interacting between the
MASS and conventional manned ships (Ødseth & Burmeister, 2014). For a long time,
there will be a situation that MASS navigates with conventional manned ships side
by side. This puts particularly pressure on MASS to communicate and take
coordinated collision avoidance actions. For example, MASS has difficulty in
detecting small targets, and how to tell a very small fishing boat without modern
technology from a rock or waves, then takes further collision avoidance actions.
There is also concern about participation of a MASS in a search and rescue operation
(SAR). This includes detection of emergency situations, e.g., identifying life boats or
rafts and reporting this to the appropriate SAR authority. A distinguish from distress
help-seekers and hostile pirate is another problems for MASS.

6.9 Job Losses and Skill Degradation

There is also a widely concern about seafarer job losses, navigational skill shortage,
and skill degradation with the further application of MASS. At present, there are
about 1.5 million seafarers worldwide. While a little part of them will transfer to
SCC, most part of them will lose their job. In addition, this kind of unmanned ship is
not likely to provide onboard training vacancies for deck and engine ratings and
cadets. As a result of autonomous navigation, it is difficult to maintain skills needed
in varying maritime activities. There will be skill degradation when a large number
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of seafarers quit their sea career. Rich navigation experience and skills are critical for
abnormal situations. Furthermore, each ship is different in its own designed factors
and operational condition, a good captain know his ship characteristics well and
perceive the different in operation. However, without the body feeling and a
Long-term focus, the CCS operators could have to learn the practical differences of
each of the ships and could easily forget or fail to recognize relevant issues when
switching the operation from one ship to another.
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Chapter 7 Safety Improvement Suggestions for MASS

7.1 Draft or Revise International Standards and Guidelines for MASS

It is highly recommended that policymakers draft new policies and laws for MASS,
and revise the existing international standards to clear the obstacle in the way
towards autonomous shipping. The development of MASS faces challenges on
design, construction, collision avoidance, marine environmental protection, crew
training, legal liability and insurance, etc. Firstly, the policymakers should learn
about the public concerns and needs before carry out legislative work. Secondly,
successful legislation experiences of driverless cars and drones are good examples
for MASS. In 2015, California has established legal regulations for fully autonomous
cars, including regulations for operation, manufacturing and safety testing for them.
In terms of drones, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden have
successively formulated regulations concerning safe management. The advancement
of technology can always promote the improvement of various rules and laws. Lastly,
co-operative actions are needed to develop international standards and guidelines for
MASS. Widely co-operation between the national administrations, classification
societies and other relevant bodies with interest in the field of MASS is
recommended for the further development. Co-operation is necessary to be able to
create a common ground for a coherent, safe approach when laying out the first
sketches of principles to be followed in the procedures to be used guiding and
controlling the technical and operational safety of MASS.

7.2 Basic Safety Concepts

A principle ship design concept of MASS is that they shall be made at least as safe as
conventional manned vessels. It is no doubt that the new born MASS will affect the
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shipping markets with uncertainty and risk on financial, and the existing safety state
and eco-system will be disturbed, e.g. significant fluctuation in accident rate at the
beginning. Furthermore, with the increasing of autonomous levels, the corresponding
ship design level of safety must be higher than the existing manned vessels. While
with the potential to reduce human errors, the MASS also increases risk and
uncertainty in autonomous system failures, emergency management and cyber
security. When the levels of autonomy move higher, the target level of safety should
be higher than the existing ships.

7.3 Qualification of New Technologies and Autonomous Systems

The new technologies and autonomous systems should be approved before widely
commercial used. MASS represent a major technological and operational revolution
which without relevant field supportive data currently available. At present, the
international conventions, e.g. SOLAS, COLREG, ISM and STCW etc., specify the
minimum standards for the design, construction, equipment, manning and operation
of ships considered to enable safe operation together. Each individual ship should
meet the specified requirements on structural design, specific equipment, size and
qualifications of crew, etc. Any deviation from the specified requirements, the new
type of ship needs to be proofed at least as safe as the existing requirements with
sufficient evidence. For the purpose of development of new technologies, basing on
such evidence, the Flag state can then issue an exemption permit for the deviant
solution in a particular ship and service.
Generally, MASS is a deviation from the existing international agreed regulations.
Thus the new technologies, autonomous systems, equipments required to be qualified
and approved by the recognized organization.
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7.4 Risks Management during Technology Transition

It needs fully prepareness in advance for the unknown risks and unexpected hazards.
From a historical point of view, new emerging things of shipping industry are always
accompanied by uncertain and risks. The transition of autonomous shipping is
expected to take place gradually, and has been claimed to require at least a couple of
decades. For a long time, there will be a picture that different levels of autonomous
ships navigate with conventional ships side by side, alongside unknown risks and
unexpected hazards. To make sure these new emerging risks and hazards under
control, during technology transition, a continuous improvement of autonomous
technologies is needed. One important aspect in the technology transition is the
management of maintenance and repair of systems, and ensuring only as-planned
interactions between e.g. subsequent software generations. The well-performed
management with standardized routines of up-to-date documentation is an important
part and feature of the systemic approach.

7.5 Improved System Robustness

Today, ship systems are designed and built to utilize a combination of maintenance
strategies to provide a sufficient safety and reliability level for the complete system
(Ødseth & Burmeister, 2014). This includes the use of technical and operational
redundancy, periodic maintenance intervals and the possibility to repair or replace
components by the crew. Obviously, crew repair/ replacement are not available for
unmanned ships. Operational redundancy will also be problematic when this involves
use of crew intervention. Therefore, it is a major challenge for MASS to improve the
system robustness to ensure the ship will not fail during the voyage.
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7.6 Update Operator Training Regime

The operators are critical factors contribute to safety navigation, and an updated
training regime of STCW will be need. Firstly, to meet the new requirement, involve
maritime universities should create new course curriculum for future maritime
professionals. Secondly, it is recommended to convert existing seafarers to MASS
operators, so as to utilize and preserve their skills. However, before any crew
reduction or transfer to MASS operators, the crew members need to be trained in any
case to fulfill all functional tasks. Thirdly, it is recommended to adjust the STCW
training regime to ensure MASS operator competence. The operators of SCC team
and on-board control team are required to have a sufficient amount of experience
related to similar ships, i.e. with regard to dimensions, deadweight and power and
their relations. Furthermore, it is critical to maintain operator good skills. Good skills
are needed in safety critical and challenging situations. Manual skills weaken when
they are not used, that is, it could be problematic if the operator usually only
monitors the ships and at times takes control. Thus, well designed simulator training
would be needed for practicing challenging safety critical situations.

7.7 Protect Against Cyber Security

They are many factors concerning cyber security, including technology
implementation, education and the organizational culture guiding performance.
Technical

speaking,

protection

against

cyber

threats

requires

eliminating

vulnerabilities in autonomous system facilities, and implementing effective measures
of intrusion prevention, and intrusion detection, damage control and security
recovery in case of system failures. With the advancing of technology, the potential
cyber attackers may become more proficient, thus the oversight on cyber security
needs to be dynamic and proactive introducing updates in the systems accordingly. In
addition, data classification, data encryption, user identification, authentication and
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authorization, prevention of unauthorized use of data, data integrity protection,
connection protection, logging and auditing are also common methods to protect
against security attacks. Furthermore, shipping companies should foster a security
culture and enhances the security awareness of operators greatly.

7.8 Improve Supporting Facilities of MASS

While developing and applying the MASS, it is recommended to improve the
supporting facilities of MASS as well. For example, autonomous service vessel with
combined underwater and drone can be used to inspect and maintain the MASS,
instead of labor work. During the maintenance phase of MASS, autonomous service
vessels with combined underwater and drone can carry out effective regular
inspections without crew on-board. Besides, supporting facilities such as fully or
semi-automatic mooring systems at port are highly needed. This kind of fully or
semi-automatic mooring systems require some modifications to the dockside
infrastructure (RR, 2016). Large number of supporting facilities will be needed to
meet the high efficient operation of MASS.

Figure 8. Semi-automated mooring system concept.
Source: AAWA white paper

47

Chapter 8 Conclusion

The MASS provides an important pathway for a sustainable development for
maritime industry. Although it is difficult to realize fully autonomous operation in
the short term, MASS revolution has begun, and autonomous navigation era is about
to come in the near future. In the present development phase, the way towards
autonomous navigation is full of uncertain and challenges on technical, economical,
legal, liability and safety management aspects.
The conclusions are:
• There are not insurmountable obstacles in terms of laws. The international
regulations and domestic laws can be amended if there is a political will.
Recognizing the existing maritime legal frameworks does not anticipate MASS, a
wide range of regulations need to be drafted or amended. A starting point is that the
MASS should be subject to the same rights and obligations as the conventional
manned ships.
• Maritime liability frameworks are also likely to undergo significant changes with
the coming MASS. The MASS will reshape a new maritime liability system due to
the new risks and new players. The existing liability rules should be reinterpreted and
amended.
• The technologies of MASS are indeed feasible. Today, the development of
autonomous vehicles, including autonomous land vehicles, aviation and also marine
vessels, have been through great progress over the past decade. The general
technologies needed to make MASS a reality laying in them.
• In terms of safety, the operation of MASS shall be at least as safe as the
conventional ships. While there is potential to reduce human error and increase
overall safety, at the same time, we should realize the new risks and challenges
which need to be identified and addressed.
• In terms of economy, MASS has the potential to reshape the maritime industry
bringing benefits such as increased operational efficiency, fuel reduction, emission
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reduction, and operational costs reduction. In addition, The MASS can also mitigate
the crisis of shortage in the supply of seafarer.
The next steps are:
• Widely cooperation is needed to adjust the maritime safety management regulatory
framework, legal framework and liability framework. Corresponding international
regulations and guidelines should be drafted or amended for MASS.
• At the beginning, the operation of MASS shall be at least as safe as the
conventional ships with fully consideration of uncertainties and potential risks. When
the levels of autonomy move higher, the target level of safety should be higher than
the existing ships.
• The transition of autonomous shipping should by small and cautious steps, so as to
make sure those new emerging risks and hazards under control. During technology
transition, a systematic approach in risk management and continuous improvement of
autonomous technologies is needed.
The safety management of MASS is a very wide and deep domain, including ship
safety, cargo safety, maritime traffic safety, environmental safety, occupational
safety and security, etc. Due to the author's limited capabilities, this dissertation
presents only the tip of the iceberg for MASS safety management, and it needs
further research and exploration.
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